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Preventive Justice and the Presumption of Innocence
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

One of the state’s most critical roles is to protect its citizens from harm. Threats of harm may be
natural or human. Human threats may exist within or without. Any government must take seriously the
need to protect its citizenry.
When it comes to preventing potential terrorists, sex offenders, and even run of the mill
criminals from harming us, the state has an interest in intervening as early as possible. However, in its
attempts at early prevention, the state appears to be caught between the demands of criminal law’s
substance and criminal law’s procedure. If the state turns to the criminal law, the reaction of criminal
law theorists and practitioners is “Get that stuff out of here. It doesn’t belong.”1 Many offenses aimed
at early prevention of criminal conduct are normatively problematic. Vagrancy offenses, which would
give police wide-ranging discretion, are unconstitutional.2 Possession offenses would and do allow
intervention at the earliest stages of preparation, but they also result in significant intrusions into the
lives of law-abiding citizens, even when such citizens intend no crimes or when the citizens will change
their minds.3 And, theorists (rightly) cry foul when the legislature creates double and triple inchoate
offenses by criminalizing acts, such as enticement, that are not themselves substantial enough for an
attempt. If the rationale for courts’ denials that preparatory acts constitute attempts is that a
defendant should not be within the reach of the criminal law, then this rationale is inappropriately
circumvented when legislators create preparatory offenses out of the very same acts. In each of these
cases, the criminal law is being extended to provide greater prevention. But when the criminal law
punishes merely standing around, merely possessing, and the earliest of preparatory acts, we have
reason to believe that the criminal law is being misused.
The response to the argument that these sorts of regulations do not belong within the
substantive criminal law seems simple: Go civil. Don’t blame; detain. But alas, here comes the second
sort of argument – the argument from the procedural side of the criminal law. Once the state has
shrugged off the substance of the criminal law, it has also potentially freed itself from the wide array of
procedural protections otherwise due to a criminal defendant.4 So, when Great Britain sought to
combat terrorism with control orders, orders that essentially provided for home detention of suspected
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I am among those theorists. See Ferzan (2011b).
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
3
Ashworth (2011); Dubber (2001).
4
Ashworth & Zedner (2010, p. 87):
Yet if the criminal law is conceived not only in substantive terms, as corresponding to particular principles
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terrorists, 5 it was met with robust critical scrutiny in the courts as the government’s actions were
viewed as an attempt to circumvent civil liberties.6
Andrew Ashworth levies the strongest charge against regimes like control orders. He claims that
these procedures evade the presumption of innocence (“PoI”) and thereby threaten it.7 He asks, “What
could be simpler, then, than for a government to circumvent the presumption by promoting legislation
that provides for the imposition of civil orders on citizens?”8
This is quite a charge. The PoI is recognized across countries.9 It is protected by the European
Convention on Human Rights.10 It is, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, an “undoubted law,
axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of criminal
law.”11
What, then, is a well meaning government supposed to do when caught between the Scylla of
substance and the Charybdis of procedure? The path of least resistance is certainly to contort criminal
law’s substance; it is a rather unregulated mess anyway.12 However, rather than defile and distort the
criminal law, the better option is to chart a new path for preventive justice.13 That path needs
substantive content that specifies the grounds on which someone may be detained or otherwise
prevented from accomplishing an illicit goal. That is, we need to know when it is permissible for the
state to prevent. But that path also needs procedure.14 And, most importantly, it needs to confront
Ashworth’s allegation that the entire enterprise runs afoul of the PoI.15 It is that procedural challenge
that this paper takes up.
The problem is that discerning how the PoI bears on preventive justice is no easy task. Indeed, it
seems that theorists rarely mean the same thing by the “PoI” when they employ it. My goal in this
paper is to break apart the myriad invocations of the presumption and then to argue that we can
extrapolate two themes that have bearing on preventive actions by the state. One is a potential
requirement of procedural symmetry. That is, we might ask whether the civil regime should have the
same procedural protections as the criminal law. The second implicit claim to be confronted is one of
5

Control orders were replaced with “terrorism prevention and investigation measures” (TPIMs). In substance,
these measures remain largely the same. See Ryder (2011).
6
See, e.g., SSHD v. JJ (and others), [2007] 3 W.L.R. 642; SSHD v. AF, [2009] 3 W.L.R. 74 (2009).
7
Ashworth (2006, p. 63).
8
Id. (p. 90).
9
See Bassiouni (1993, p. 266 n. 142 & 143)(finding five international conventions and sixty seven constitutions
with the PoI); Stuckenberg (this issue) (“there seems to be no legal order left which openly rejects the maxim”).
10
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) § 6(2).
11
Coffin v. US, 156 U.S. 432 (1895).
12
Stuntz (2001).
13
I borrow the term “preventive justice” from Ashworth and Zedner. See
http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/projects/PreventiveJustice.
14
Ashworth and Zedner (forthcoming 2012) (“The development of appropriate restraining principles and of
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15
Notably, Ashworth (and Zedner) agree that the criminal law ought not to be distorted in the name of procedure.
See id.
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the criminal law’s substantive priority. The idea is that the criminal law has first (and perhaps exclusive)
jurisdiction over certain kinds of questions.
This paper does three things. First, I briefly sketch a regime of preventive interference that I
have previously defended.16 Given that the application of both the procedural symmetry and
substantive priority claims are going to apply differently for different regimes, this section aims to
provide context for the PoI inquiry. Second, I break apart the myriad invocations of the PoI, ultimately
extrapolating themes of both procedural symmetry and substantive priority. Simply put, some claims
about the PoI bottom out in claims about how the state ought to treat us in terms of procedure while
other claims about the PoI bottom out in claims about the primacy of the criminal trial. Third, I discuss
how the claims of procedural symmetry and substantive priority apply to the regime that I have
defended, concluding that the criminal trial is not entitled to substantive priority and tentatively
endorsing a beyond a reasonable doubt (BRD) standard for the civil regime.

I.

Defending Detention

In Beyond Crime and Commitment, I argue that some acts of preventive interference by the
state can be justified in the same way that we justify self-defense against Culpable Aggressors.17 The
self-defense literature distinguishes between permissible killing that is liability-based and permissible
killing that is not.18 Take two cases. In the first case, a Culpable Aggressor points a gun at the defender,
and says, “I am going to kill you.” In the second case, the defender has fallen to the bottom of a well
and the defender’s mortal enemy then pushes a fat man (the “Innocent Threat”) down the well to kill
him.19 If the Innocent Threat lands on him, the defender will die and the Innocent Threat will live. The
defender has a ray gun with which he can disintegrate the Innocent Threat. Theorists struggle with
whether self-defense is permissible in the Innocent Threat case, and many theorists believe that the
culpability of the Culpable Aggressor is significant in distinguishing whether and how much defensive
force may be used against him as opposed to the Innocent Threat.20
We can distinguish between the Culpable Aggressor and the Innocent Threat on the basis of
liability. “Liability” in this context is best viewed as a limited forfeiture of rights.21 In the same way that
we can change our rights and duties through contracts, promises, and permissions, liability to defense is
about acting in a way that relinquishes one’s right and complaint against others acting to repel one’s
attack.22
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Ferzan (2011a).
Id.; see also Alexander and Ferzan (2012); Ferzan (2011b).
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See Frowe (2010); Quong (2009).
19
See Nozick (1974, pp. 34-35)(offering the original formulation of this problem). For ease of exposition, I have
omitted Innocent Aggressors, whom I would group with Innocent Threats.
20
Frowe (2010, pp. 267-68); McMahan (2009, p. 159).
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Ferzan (2012).
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By culpably threatening the defender, the Culpable Aggressor relinquishes his moral complaint
against the defender taking the aggressor at his word.23 The Culpable Aggressor cannot object that his
bullet might have missed, or he might have changed his mind, or the police might have stopped him.24
Rather, once the Culpable Aggressor chooses to present himself as a threat, he is not wronged by the
defender stopping the threat from occurring. In other words, the Culpable Aggressor acts in a way that
permits the defender to act on the defender’s prediction. No right of the Culpable Aggressor’s stands in
the defender’s way of using responsive defensive force.
Although liability explains why one may kill the Culpable Aggressor, it cannot justify killing the
Innocent Threat. The Innocent Threat is a mere projectile who did not even will the movement of his
body. However, the fact that the Innocent Threat is not liable to be killed does not entail that it is
impermissible to kill him. Note, however, that if there is a reason why you are allowed to kill the
Innocent Threat, it is not because he has done anything to forfeit his right to life, but rather, because it is
unfair to ask you to privilege his life compared to yours.25 Thus, the structure of why it is we may
permissibly kill an Innocent Threat can be easily distinguished from liability, where the aggressor forfeits
his right by his own conduct. The self-defense literature thus recognizes a distinction between those
instances in which the aggressor as a responsible moral agent behaves in such a way that grounds a
preventive response and those instances in which the aggressor’s own conduct does not justify the
response but the defender cannot fairly be asked to assume the burden.
This structure has a natural application to preventive interference by the state. The aggressor is
a responsible agent. He performs an act in furtherance of a culpable intention. And, based on that act, it
becomes permissible to stop him. These cases can be contrasted to “pure prevention,” where along with
Innocent Threats, the question is not what the aggressor has done, but whether it is fair to allow the
defender to respond. Liability to defensive force provides a crucial framework that allows the state to
intervene against responsible agents based on the exercise of their agency and not mere predictions
that they will one day harm us.
Let me be clear about the nature of this claim. I am not stating that the government is acting in
self-defense. Rather, I am arguing that the very principles by which a Culpable Aggressor renders himself
liable to defensive force and therefore is not wronged by preventive interferences are equally applicable
when the state aims to stop the aggressor from harming others. It is certainly the case that because the
state has significant resources (and perhaps the luxury of time) that the state will not operate in the
same “stop ‘em in their tracks”26 way that an individual must in a case of self-defense. And, thus,
although the differences between citizen and state may lead to different implications for the types of
preventive interferences that are permissible in the context, the point – that the aggressor has forfeited
his moral complaint against such actions – remains. Therefore, it is possible to have an autonomyrespecting preventive regime.
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With respect to state preventive interference, how would the liability conditions be formulated?
First, like self-defense, the actor should be culpable—meaning that he either has an intention to cause
harm or he is willing to unjustifiably risk it (and lacks a justification or excuse). Indeed, at this point, it
appears that the state has good reason to intervene. The actor has decided to do something he ought
not to do. For legality purposes, an act should also be required.27 Allowing the state unfettered police
power to intervene in lives based on mere intentions could certainly lead to abuse.
Once the actor has performed an action in furtherance of his culpable mental state, what may
the state do? We know what self-defense looks like—typically some sort of physical injury to an
attacker that is aimed at stopping the attack. But once we think of prevention beyond the prospect of
preventively detaining people, what sorts of measures are we talking about?
There are a range of other measures that may also substantially interfere with an individual’s
liberty short of incapacitation. Great Britain used a control order, a construct of the Prevention of
Terrorism Act of 2005.28 Admittedly, these control orders were subject to significant scholarly criticisms,
and this example is not intended as a proposal the United States should adopt whole cloth.29 Indeed, the
British government announced in 2011 that it planned to abolish control orders and replace them with
“terrorism prevention and investigation measures.”30 However, there is little difference between the
two and control orders remain useful to illustrate how to begin to conceptualize preventive action short
of punishment.
The non-derogating control order allows the Home Secretary to impose numerous restrictions
on those whom he has “reasonable grounds for suspecting” is involved in terrorism-related activity.31
The PTA 2005 provides for just about every preventive intervention one can imagine. Specifically, what
the person possesses, what activities he engages in, where he works, with whom he associates in and
outside of his home, where he can go, when he can be outside his home, whether he maintains his
passport, when and how his property may be searched and retained, whether he is photographed, and
whether he is electronically monitored are all possibilities under this provision.32
Unlike control orders, it is clear that we would want to designate some fact finder, to determine by a
constitutionally set standard that an actor harbors a culpable mental state, has committed an action in
furtherance of that mental state, and plans to complete the offense. Then, an agency would need to be
tasked with supervising the actor in ways designed to prevent the commission of that particular crime.
This supervision would be reconsidered at specific times, and supervision would cease once a showing
was made that the defendant no longer harbors an illicit mental state.33
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Clearly, this brief summary cannot fully defend the standards by which different interferences could
be justified. The question here, however, is whether the entire idea is a nonstarter because it threatens
the PoI. Even if substantively defensible, the regime must confront Ashworth’s challenge.

II.

The Letter and Spirit of the PoI

Does such a regime threaten the PoI? That depends entirely on what the PoI requires. I shall
assume that this regime may properly be considered civil, as declaring the regime to be criminal would
simply circumvent the entire analysis of what a civil regime requires. I defend this treatment
elsewhere.34
To U.S. readers the entire concept of the PoI applying to preventive detention strikes a
discordant chord because within the United States, the presumption is close to hollow rhetoric. The
Court’s interpretation of this presumption is extraordinary narrow. Kentucky v. Wharton held that
failure to give an instruction on the PoI does not in and of itself violate the Constitution.35 US v. Salerno
upheld the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act, allowing a court to prejudge the defendant’s case
and to use the fact of indictment as evidence that the defendant will commit another offense.36 Even
Estelle v. Williams, which almost gave teeth to the presumption by holding that the state cannot force
the defendant to be tried in prison garb, failed to give the presumption much bite by holding that the
failure to object waived the error.37 Generally, the PoI is thought just to be the reasonable doubt rule.38
In contrast, in adjudicating alleged violations of the PoI as codified by the European Convention
on Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights has given the PoI sharp teeth. Two cases should
suffice to draw the stark contrast in jurisprudential approach. In Allenet de Ribemont v. France, the
court held that the PoI was infringed when prior to trial, high ranking French police officers commented
to the press that the defendant was an accomplice to murder.39 In Geerings v. Netherlands, a judge
determined by a balance of probabilities that the defendant did commit thefts and ordered forfeiture of
his assets. However, because the defendant had been acquitted of these charges, the European Court
of Human Rights held that this violated the PoI.40
My goal is not to analyze the PoI as understood by United States Supreme Court or the
European Court of Human Rights. Rather, because we aim for preventive justice, we should take a look
at the theoretical arguments regarding the PoI’s meaning. That is, we cannot answer Ashworth’s
challenge merely by stating that his arrow misses the target as we might narrowly interpret that target.

34

Ferzan (draft).
441 U.S. 786 (1979).
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481 U.S. 739 (1987).
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425 US 501 (1976).
38
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Our goal should be to first start by trying to understand what work the presumption does for theorists
who invoke it.
Theoretically within and without the United States, there is broad disagreement about the
meaning of the PoI.41 Theorists have invoked the PoI with respect to trial, preventive detention, pleas,
prosecutorial ethics, self-incrimination, preventive detention, and even criminalization. It is seen as a
narrow, concrete rule to some authors -- that is, the PoI just is the BRD rule.42 In contrast, others argue
that “[t]he presumption of innocence should be accorded a broad meaning as a symbol of the proper
attitude of the state towards the individual.”43 Liz Campbell endorses both positions; to her, the PoI is
both a procedural rule and a more general embodiment of “civic trust, respect for the person, and
protection from the State.”44
Needless to say, theorists seem to be talking past one another, and quite frequently, the
presumption appears to be little more than rhetorical window dressing while other background
assumptions are doing the real heavy lifting. My goal in this paper is not to argue for one understanding
of the presumption. Instead, I aim to extrapolate themes that have bearing on preventive detention.
For our purposes, I will argue that we can extract both the procedural symmetry argument and the
substantive priority claim from the various usages of the presumption. No doubt this extrapolation may
run roughshod over some nuances, but ultimately, I think these nuances are immaterial for our goal,
which is not to settle on a construction of the presumption. Moreover, I certainly leave open the
possibility that a theorist could account for all these various invocations within one theory of political
morality.45
Because there are so many moving pieces, both in terms of the various stages in which the
presumption might apply (pretrial detention v. trial, etc.), and as to what it might mean, it is worth
putting various constructions on the table, and then seeing how these constructions pertain to the
various stages.
A. Constructions of the PoI
1. Material or Probatory?
We need to first distinguish between probatory (court-decided, legal) innocence and material
(factual, actual) innocence (or guilt).46 A probatory PoI means that the jury (or other state actor) starts
with the presumption that it simply has no evidence of the defendant’s guilt. A material PoI would
41

Laudan (2006, p. 91).
For a cautionary note against an expansive reading of the presumption, see Schwikkard (1998)(arguing (1) by
conjoining other rights with the presumption, these rights become vulnerable when the presumption itself is
inapplicable and (2) different policy justifications lead to different conclusions about when rights may be infringed
and the normative force of the presumption will be undermined if it is allowed to be overridden frequently).
43
Kitai-Sangero (2009, p. 908).
44
Campbell (this issue).
45
See, e.g., Duff (forthcoming a) (offering an account that reconciles the PoI at trial, pretrial detention, and police
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Laudan (2006, p. 12).
42

7

mean that the jury is asked to presume that the defendant is not in fact guilty. In other words, to
believe that an individual is materially innocent is to believe that he did not in fact commit the offense
whereas to believe an individual is probatory innocent is to believe that one has no proof that the
defendant committed the offense.47
It bears noting that we may not need to choose amongst these conception at the outset, as both
conceptions of innocence may have a role in some cases. Consider questions about prosecutorial ethics.
If we think that actual innocence has bearing on what a prosecutor should do post-conviction, then
whether the defendant really is innocent matters.48 However, when deciding whether to go to trial, we
might ask whether a prosecutor should be guided by his personal beliefs about the facts, what he thinks
he can prove, or both.49
2. Real or Rhetorical?
Another fundamental question concerning the PoI is whether it has any real work to do. If it is
just a corollary of the reasonable doubt rule, which itself is compelled by due process, then does the PoI
do anything besides add rhetorical flourish to other more central ideas?50 That is, there are background
arguments about political morality that must be made to give the presumption content, including
arguments about whether to give the presumption a material or probatory innocence construction.
These arguments are not compelled by the nature of a presumption or by the nature of innocence.
Rather, they are compelled by other concepts within our political morality. Thus, one should always
question what is doing the real work.51
Notably, this question is all the more complex because the European Convention on Human
Rights codifies the presumption, but the European Court on Human Rights allows the presumption to be
infringed.52 This means that the presumption may ultimately be unpacked into more abstract principles
that are doing the real moral work, but in the European context, pointing to the presumption is pointing
to something more than rhetorical, simply because it is codified as such.
Relatedly, if we take the PoI in some instances to point to something aspirational, we will want
to ask how we can get from an abstract ideal to a concretized rule. We might readily grasp why our
political morality compels proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But when the presumption is taken to
compel other acts, we must ask how the theoretical idea relates to the doctrine being justified. We
cannot simply rest on our laurels by citing to the presumption. A further account is needed. Thus, it is
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Although the “no evidence” presumption is not a presumption of innocence, Rinat Kitai-Sangero argues in favor
of the PoI because of the psychological effect it will have; she claims that innocence prevents alienation of the
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Friedman (2000).
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Laufer (1995).
49
Cf. Lippke (this issue).
50
Cf. Stuckenberg (this issue).
51
Id.
52
Salabiaku v. France, (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 379.
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essential in evaluating how theorists invoke the presumption to understand exactly what it is that they
are claiming and why.
B. Possible Applications of the PoI
1. The PoI at Trial
The clearest application of the PoI is to the trial. In this context, the thinnest interpretation of
the PoI is that it just is the corollary of the reasonable doubt rule.53 But even at this point, our faith in
the clarity of the presumption can unravel. What exactly does it mean to tell the jury they need to
presume the defendant is innocent? Is this material or probatory innocence? Laudan raises a range of
concerns with viewing the PoI as one of material innocence: How can jurors simply adopt beliefs
contrary to facts (such as that the defendant was arrested and charged, and thus likely isn’t innocent)
and how do individual jurors hold the belief that the defendant is materially innocent until the very
moment when the jury collectively reaches the conclusion that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
is satisfied?54 Laudan argues instead for probatory innocence: “What is important is that the juror
concedes that she has no proof now about guilt and that, therefore, she lacks any clue about which side
will eventually prevail. This is a patently true description of her situation and any juror should accede to
its truth.”55
The most natural extension of the PoI is to exculpatory defenses.56 Many American theorists
question the singular focus on offense elements and suggest that defenses should be disproved beyond
a reasonable doubt.57 Indeed, the analysis of the Winship/Mullaney/Patterson trilogy has felled many a
tree. And across the Atlantic, the PoI is explicitly protected by the European Convention on Human
Rights. The UK’s Human Rights Act 1988 reinforces its application domestically. The European Court of
Human Rights has required that member states confine presumptions “within reasonable limits which
take into account the importance of what is at stake and maintain the rights of the defense.”58 The
application of this amorphous test led the Sheldrake court to employ a balancing test for analyzing
alleged violations of the PoI, whereby reversal of the burden of persuasion is acceptable when it is
proportional to a legitimate objective.59 This test has provoked significant criticism.60
Clearly, placing a “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden on the state speaks to underlying
theoretical commitments.61 Most importantly, the presumption expresses a concern that an individual
should not be branded a criminal unless we are as close to certain as is possible. False conviction is an
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egregious wrong. Second, we might also think that the presumption speaks to the significant
differences in resources between the state and the criminal defendant.
It is in this application that the presumption is at its most concrete, but perhaps also at its least
useful. Certainly, our political morality, through the Due Process Clause, ought to require not only that
the state have the burden but also that it be significant. And, the jury ought to be reminded that they
do not have any proof of guilt until that guilt is presented. These things are required, but it is not clear
whether the invocation of the “PoI” is doing any work.62 That is, we might conclude that (1) in this
context, innocence is probatory, not material and (2) that the invocation is rhetorical, rather than real
(at least in the American context), as the real bite comes from the Due Process Clause or other views
about political morality.
Under this construction, how does the PoI apply to preventive justice? The take away of this
application is that we must vigilantly guard against the state’s misuse of its power, either intentionally or
by mistake, by placing a significant onus on the state before it infringes a person’s liberty. Hence, the
PoI is an ideal that compels certain procedures and might mandate that the same procedures apply to
preventive regimes as to punitive ones.
2. The PoI and Other Criminal Processes
Some theorists seek to deploy the PoI in other criminal proceedings and dispositions, including
pleas, deferred prosecutions, and pretrial detention.63 Consider pretrial detention. Shima Baradaran
argues that the PoI should preclude certain factors, including the indicted offense and future
dangerousness, in determining whether to release a defendant on bail.64 These factors, Baradaran
argues, conflict with the view that the defendant ought to be presumed innocent until conviction.65
Notice that the application of the presumption in the context of pretrial detention stands is
nothing like the previous invocation. It is first and foremost a claim about substantive priority, and
indeed substantive exclusivity – only at a criminal trial may the evidence be evaluated so as to make a
determination about guilt. It is consistent with either a view that the defendant ought to be treated as
materially innocent, or probatory innocent, or both. More importantly, this view of the presumption
means that it is essential to the correct treatment of the case, as opposed to being superfluous to due
process. Indeed, the PoI is needed to provide content to due process—namely, that it is not a matter of
proving some fact by some specific burden, but that only the trial can adjudicate these facts. It is, as
Stuckenburg calls it, a view of the presumption as a “flank defense” that protects the primacy of the
criminal process. 66 To put the point another way, having a judge decide pretrial detention factors
beyond a reasonable doubt would not cut it. The criminal trial is the only appropriate venue for this
determination.
62

Cf. Stuckenberg (this issue).
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This claim--that only a criminal trial may judge guilt--has implications when the state aims to
stop an actor from committing an offense. It leads to the question of whether a preventive regime can
stand alongside the criminal law. We might worry that no procedural protections can remedy a claim of
substantive priority.

3. The PoI and Criminal Investigations
The presumption is also thought to animate or closely relate to other procedural rights,
including those related to self-incrimination and search and seizure.67 Of course, as one seeks to extend
the presumption beyond trial, the question of what the presumption means becomes even more
difficult. If police are to believe the defendant innocent, how do they justify searching him?68 And if the
standard for overcoming the presumption is met for the search, why is the defendant entitled to the
presumption anew when it comes to bail or even trial?69 What about the relationship between citizen
and state entitles the defendant to de novo review of the very same issue at every stage of criminal
inquiry?
What would it mean for the PoI to apply at these points? As noted above, it can’t mean that the
police must treat the defendant as if he is actually innocent, because then they could not justify their
conduct.70 Rather, it seems that the presumption is again an abstract moral ideal that animates more
concrete rights – such as the right to remain silent.71 Notably, if the presumption is applicable here, it
reveals that not only do we not have one addressee, the jury, but we do not even have one standard.
After all, no one thinks that the police need proof beyond a reasonable doubt before they conduct a
search. And, that means that there is something of a sliding scale that must balance the state’s need to
investigate crime against the individual’s liberty. It would mean that the presumption does not entail
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
For our purposes, we should note that the presumption, as it would apply here, again points to
procedural symmetry, but not to the criminal law’s substantive priority. There is nothing about the
claims of how the state ought to act in these contexts that has any clear implications for when the
criminal law ought to be used.

4. The Presumption’s Other Duties
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And still the PoI’s job is not done. Theorists argue that it constrains preventive detention;72
limits state stigmatization;73 and even places limits on the very content of the criminal law. 74 Consider
the recent European Court on Human Rights decisions, maintaining that the presumption is implicated
when a state actor articulates of an opinion on the defendant’s guilt before trial or a court expresses
doubts about the defendant’s innocence after acquittal. In both of these situations, the state is
stigmatizing the defendant without proceeding through the correct mechanism.75 If these actions
engage the presumption, then it is because the European Court on Human Rights maintains that there
are only some institutions that may properly declare guilt. It therefore begins to look like a flank
defense, protecting the integrity of the criminal trial by holding that the adjudication of criminal guilt is
the only mechanism by which it becomes permissible for the state to “speak” about the defendant’s
guilt. Then, the presumption has bite not only as substantive priority, but also as substantive exclusivity.

C. Summary

There is, of course, much to be said for being able to wrap one’s preferred conception within
the blanket of the PoI. The rhetorical force of one’s argument is more persuasive when what the state
threatens to do is pull at the golden thread.76 Moreover, some confusion is unavoidable because the
presumption is codified in the European context, but it is not in the United States.
Nevertheless, as I hope is clear from the discussion above, the claims about the PoI can be
(somewhat) neatly sorted into claims that speak to procedure and claims that speak to the priority of
the criminal law. The irony is that with respect to claims about procedure, the presumption is both at its
most concrete and at its most unnecessary. The questions of how the state should treat its citizens and
the burdens that should be imposed upon the state follow quite directly from an account of political
morality. (It is not my intention to offer such an account here, but rather to simply point out that this is
from whence the presumption gains its content in these cases.) In contrast, the PoI seems to have its
most significant bite when it defends the territory of the criminal law by arguing that the criminal law
has exclusive jurisdiction, or substantial priority, over other sorts of determinations. In these cases, the
presumption holds that a defendant cannot incur negative consequences from accused wrongdoing
absent a finding of criminal guilt.
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III.

The PoI and Preventive Justice: Procedural Symmetry, Substantive Priority, Both, or
Neither?

Thus far, I have aimed to sort the PoI claims into two themes that could have bearing on preventive
regimes. The first question is whether the criminal law has substantive priority over preventive regimes.
The second question is whether procedural symmetry is required. I will argue that criminal law does not
“occupy the field” in such a way as to preclude preventive justice. I will then address procedural
symmetry. Because any procedural symmetry claim will depend upon the nuances of a particular
regime (detaining terrorists is different in kind from detaining the dangerous and mentally ill), I will
discuss procedural symmetry with the regime I have defended in mind. Ultimately, I will tentatively
endorse a beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
A. The Substantive Priority of the Criminal Law
As we have seen, the PoI sometimes seems to protect the territory of the criminal law. If the PoI
requires that the state treat citizens with a degree of trust unless and until they are found guilty of a
crime, then does a preventive regime improperly funnel potential offenders out of the criminal justice
system? I think we should pay careful attention to Justice Stevens’ worry in Allen that “permitting a
State to create a shadow criminal law without the fundamental protection of the Fifth Amendment
conflicts with the respect for liberty and individual dignity that has long characterized, and that
continues to characterize, our free society.”77 We aren’t dealing with the Fifth Amendment here, but
the concern about a shadow criminal justice system remains.
What does a claim of substantive priority consist in? Consider, for example, the way the substantive
priority point might work with pretrial detention. The concern with pretrial detention is a prejudging of
the defendant’s guilt. If the state may detain an individual based partially upon the likelihood that he
committed the crime for which he is indicted and partly upon the potential to commit other offenses,
then we may be rightly concerned that there is some sort of conclusive finding, itself sufficient to justify
detention, that occurs prior to the criminal trial to which the defendant is entitled. A defendant might
rightly complain that such detention violates the substantive claim of the PoI. The substantive priority
point may be put most forcefully as “Treat me as materially innocent, unless and until you can convict
me.”
The question for a preventive regime is, if the state seeks to intercede prior to the commission of a
criminal offense in a way that prevents that offense from occurring does it somehow prejudge the guilt
of the offender? Does it essentially predict criminality thus leading to two potential criticisms: (1) that
the defendant is not being given the ability to choose rightly and (2) the defendant is being denied the
mechanism by which he can establish his innocence – the trial itself. I am not going to attend to the first
objection because it is a substantive objection that should be raised in the context of a particular
regime. That is, the worry expressed by the first objection is that by predicting that someone will not
77
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choose rightly and acting based on that prediction, the state is failing to trust the potential offender in
the way that it should.78 I won’t provide a substantive defense of my regime here.79
As for the second question, when is the potential offender entitled to a trial? That is, what is
the scope of the substantive priority claim? Stuckenberg suggests that the critical inquiry in determining
when a measure implicates the presumption is when it is intended to be punitive.80 He does not rule
out pretrial detention or preventive detention so long as they are not penal in character, the innocent
could equally be subject to them, and compensation is available upon acquittal.81 From the holdings of
the European Court on Human Rights, Campbell extracts the general principle that “the presumption of
innocence is engaged where an agent of the State expresses a view on a person’s culpability instead of
determining and attributing criminal guilt in the traditional way, but only where this declaration
encourages the public to believe him guilt, and where there is a prejudgment of the assessment of the
facts by any competent judicial authority.”82 These views seem to indicate that so long as the
mechanism for preventive detention does not judge “criminality” and communicate such, the criminal
law has no jurisdiction over the matter. This would mean that preventive actions, so long as they are
not intended as criminal nor intended to communicate criminality, do not substantively engage the
presumption.83
Although this might be one way out, I think we should interrogate the substantive priority claim
somewhat more directly, as I think it is somewhat dubious to think that the criminal law actually should
maintain exclusive jurisdiction over adjudications of guilt. That is, criminal law has to share the blame
game with other fora. To begin with, in practice, there are myriad state behaviors that preempt use of
the criminal process that we find wholly unobjectionable. Substantive priority would mean that
criminal enforcement agencies should not defer to available civil remedies. Yet, it seems
counterintuitive to think that the United States Attorney’s Office should not consider whether the
Securities and Exchange Commission can adequately deal with securities fraud as a civil matter.
Indeed, what is perhaps most interesting is the theoretical conflict between the substantive
priority argument and the view of the criminal law as last resort. Now, the view that the criminal law
should be a last resort is difficult to articulate.84 Moreover, it is hard to square the last resort view with
the position that the criminal law should express censure or achieve retributive justice.85 As to either of
these goals, it seems that the criminal law need not, and sometimes should not, take a back seat.
Nevertheless, it bears noting that a preventive regime that would avoid resorting to the criminal law is
arguably more consistent with the ultima ratio principle than is the substantive priority argument.
78

This formulation of what is otherwise called an “autonomy” or “free will” objection is due to Patrick Tomlin’s
insightful interjection during the Minnesota preventive justice conference.
79
But see Ferzan (2011a).
80
Stuckenberg (this issue).
81
Id.
82
Campbell (this issue).
83
Cf. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963).
84
See Husak (2004); Jareborg (2004).
85
Ashworth and Zedner (2012)(arguing that the last resort principle is about effectiveness and the nature of the
wrongdoing determines whether the action should be handled within the civil or criminal domain); Husak (2004).

14

Additionally, if this sort of claim has bite, then one might wonder whether the appropriate
remedy for it is simply procedural parity. If the concern is simply that one can be “branded” a criminal
without the beyond a reasonable doubt standard and other procedural protections, then any pull of
substantive priority might simply be remedied by require procedural parity rather than by requiring the
use of the criminal law itself. If we need BRD, then let’s have BRD.
To this point, we have seen that preventive regimes may have two ways of avoiding the
substantive priority of the criminal law. First, if the regime does not communicate criminal censure
(e.g., detaining the mentally ill), the substantive priority claim is not implicated. Second, if the regime
requires BRD, the substantive priority charge may sometimes be met.86 These two rejoinders will cover
a wide range of cases, but not all. It cannot be the case that pretrial detention is authorized so long as
the judge finds that the defendant committed the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor
does it explain why civil findings of securities fraud are permissible.
So, how do we walk the line between admitting that we have myriad mechanisms that
stigmatize and judge culpability that don’t run afoul of the PoI and recognizing that there are some
instances, such as pretrial detention, that do seem to fail to recognize the rightful role of the criminal
trial? Let me venture two answers. First, there is likely much wisdom in the European Court of Human
Rights’ requirement that a criminal proceeding must be initiated for the PoI to be engaged.87 The
substantive priority thesis has the most bite when we think that once the state has gone down the
criminal law road, it must do it the right way. It should neither prejudge guilt nor ignore not guilty
verdicts. This is why our current approach to pretrial detention implicates the PoI. However, according
to this construction of the substantive priority claim, a preventive regime that aims to displace the
criminal law would not implicate the PoI.
This leaves the concern that there are other stigmatizing acts. Does the PoI have any bearing
outside the criminal process itself? To my mind, the reason that that PoI seems to clash with concerns
about DNA collection, the forfeiture of assets after an acquittal of the crime, or the use of a prior charge
(or even prior acquittal) as a bad act admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) stems from a
completely different problem. The United States, at least, lacks the resources to declare innocence. If
the defendant is acquitted, can civil proceedings begin? Of course, we say, because this is a different
standard. But that misses the thrust of the PoI objection – that the criminal justice system does not
proclaim innocence in any manner. Ultimately, this is not a PoI objection; it is a concern about the lack
of preclusive effect of an acquittal. When acquitted, a defendant’s name is never cleared and suspicion
lives on. 88 Advocates who wish to wipe the slate clean must create a mechanism for so doing—an
adjudication of innocence, not just “not guilty.”89 No doubt there are difficulties with creating such a
mechanism. The critical point, however, is this: the question of what preclusive effect an acquittal
should have is not a PoI question.
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What does this mean for preventive detention? It means that so long as the state opts for a
preventive mechanism, and not the criminal law, it can do so, irrespective of whether such a system
communicates some amount of censure. The criminal law does not have sole dibs on being a censuring
institution. However, to the extent that a preventive system does have some of the trappings of a
criminal institution, or speaks to the same sorts of concerns, procedural symmetry may be warranted.

B. The Argument for Procedural Symmetry
In addressing the question of procedural symmetry, this paper will consider only the burden of
proof. This is an undertaking in itself. Notably, considerations beyond the PoI must be taken into
account in determining which other procedural rights should be provided in a preventive regime. These
are certainly important questions, but they are questions for another day.
Ultimately, what is crucial about procedural symmetry claims is that they are extracted from
claims about the relationship between the citizen and the state. They are fundamentally questions
about how the state should treat us, what stance it should have toward us, and how procedural burdens
should work in light of power imbalances. The state treats us differently in different sorts of situations,
and thus, we need to pay close attention to how preventive interferences are similar to, and different
from, the criminal process.
In criminal cases, the state must prove BRD that the defendant committed the offense. (I am
going to presuppose that BRD is the appropriate standard for criminal trials.) An argument for
procedural symmetry would require a reason for imposing this same burden in prevention cases. Some
theorists view the BRD standard as a way of distributing errors—by adopting a standard that far prefers
false acquittals to false convictions.90 That would mean that we would need to think that the type of
errors warrant a BRD standard for prevention cases. On the other hand, other theorists view the burden
of proof, not as distributing errors, but as a commitment to refusing to balance the individual against
the community. Alex Stein argues BRD is about “the state’s fundamental political obligation to treat its
citizens with equal concern and respect,”91 where this respect requires that the “legal system may
justifiably convict a person only if it did its best in protecting that person from the risk of erroneous
conviction and if it does not provide better protection to other individuals.”92 BRD thus evidences a
“comprehensive and unyielding immunity” from the risk of erroneous conviction.”93
Therefore, in asking whether these requirements likewise require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in civil cases, we should consider three questions. The first question is whether the wrong of false
detention is the same as the wrong of false conviction such that the same standard ought to apply. The
second question is whether, even if the wrongs are different, they are equally bad, or the wrong of false
detention is sufficiently weighty such that the same standard ought to apply even though they are
90
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different wrongs. The third avenue for analysis would take up an evaluation of type I and type II errors
to see whether the balance between false positives and false negatives would likewise yield a beyond a
reasonable doubt standard.
1. Same Wrong, Same Standard?
The cleanest argument for symmetry would be one that claims that the very interest at stake
with respect to punishment is also at stake with respect to preventive detention. That is, we might
proceed along a similar vein as Patrick Tomlin’s approach to criminalization; he claims that “if what
drives our support for the PoI is that we wish to protect people from inappropriate punishment, then
the risk of punishing them for non punishment-worthy conduct should elicit the same level of concern as
the risk of punishing them for things they have not done.”94
Although our inquiry is different than Tomlin’s, we can start with his premise – that the PoI
bears a direct connection to the fact that we believe it is morally wrong for innocent individuals to suffer
punishment and that it is so wrong as to warrant a high burden of proof.95 Unjust punishment is
intrinsically bad.96
Unfortunately, this approach does not support the symmetry thesis. Normatively, prevention
and punishment are not the same sorts of acts. When the government punishes, it aims to give the
defender what he deserves, and the liberty deprivation and stigma the offender suffers are constitutive
of that punishment. Prevention, on the other hand, does not have this structure. The goal is to stop the
crime from occurring and the liberty deprivation is associated with that goal.
To see this most clearly, consider a direct case of self-defense. Assume that a defender
mistakenly believes that someone is aggressing against him. Here, there is something understandable
about what the defender does, and we can ask, what confidence level the defender must have before
he should act. Because the defender aims to protect himself—rather than to condemn his aggressor—
we might think the defender need not wait for practical certainty before defending himself. And, if the
defender acts on evidence that would, say, satisfy the clear and convincing evidence standard, the type
of complaint the aggressor would have would differ from that of someone wrongfully punished. Hence,
because a false positive in these practices constitutes a different wrong, we cannot unquestioningly
import the criminal standard into the civil regime.
2. Different Wrong, Same Standard?
The argument that a false positive in the context of prevention is not the same wrong as a false
conviction does not tell us anything about whether the wrong is still itself sufficient to warrant proof
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BRD.97 Let us return to self-defense and think about a mistaken self-defender. Generally, we think that
the reasonably mistaken self-defender is, at the very least, excused. A defender who thinks someone is
attacking him, but is wrong in his judgment, does not seem to convey the same moral message that a
punisher conveys. How wrongful is the liberty restriction (and perhaps unintended sitgma) of a
preventive action?
Now, we might note the difficulty in transition from an individual’s act of self-defense to the
state using its machinery to achieve the same goal. However, it is critical to recognize that the goal is
indeed the same. We focus on the fact that when we are dealing with self-defense, the goal is not to
achieve some further good (such as giving an offender what he deserves) but simply to protect oneself.
This is the role of the state. The aim is first and foremost security for all citizens. The state can achieve
this security by situational crime prevention, a preventive regime, and/or the threat of punishment
(backed by its imposition). All three of these methods, when mistakenly imposed (that is employed
against someone who is not a threat), convey some sort of meaning to the innocent. Situational crime
prevention shows a lack of trust, the preventive regime I advocate shows a lack of trust with a basis in
the intention to commit a future crime, and punishment shows condemnation for wrongdoing.
Indeed, we are less troubled by situational crime prevention (also known as put the cookie jar
where little Johnnie can’t reach it.) If we really worried that being prevented from doing things we
never intended to do was superlatively evil, we would worry about every physical barrier that could
have been merely a sign; every internet search blockage by our employers that we don’t even know
about because we never perform impermissible searches to begin with; every carefully crafted email
designed to prevent our affront that we never would have been insulted by anyway. I do not doubt that
we may suffer significantly from false predictions of our future wrongdoing, but the claim of “I wasn’t
going to” is not the claim of “I didn’t.” Prevention qua prevention just is not morally on par with
punishment.
The regime I propose, of course, isn’t just moving the cookie jar out of reach. It is a state
process, culminating in a finding that Johnnie did indeed intend to take a cookie, with a remedy that the
state gets to intrude in Johnnie’s life until Johnnie dispenses with that intention. Still, the state’s goal is
not to say anything about Johnnie—those findings are incidental to the state’s primary goal—which is
still protection. The question is, given that self-defense certainly does not require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt before acting against a believed culpable aggressor, does the machinery of the state
itself translate the wrong into one of equal severity? To my mind, the clear and convincing standard
that is sufficiently to lock someone up as mentally ill and dangerous is more on par with the wrong
imposed by a false positive under the preventive regime proposed.98
3. Error Distribution
Even if preventive interference is not as wrong as the punishment of the innocent, we might
think that the costs of type one and type two errors nevertheless counsels in favor of a BRD standard.
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However, a careful parsing of this claim yields that prevention warrants a lower standard than
punishment. Consider false positives. In the criminal context, a false positive means that we are locking
up an innocent person (a terrible injustice) and that we are letting a guilty person go free (another
injustice).99 In the preventive context, we restrict the liberty of someone who would not commit an
offense (a substantial injustice) but we may be wrong that there is any criminal plan at all, so we are not
unwittingly freeing the future guilty. It may simply be the case that there is no wrongdoer because
there is no criminal intent. False positives are worse for punishment regimes than for preventive ones.
What harms are caused by false negatives? We are relatively familiar with the concerns caused
by false negatives in the context of a criminal trial – the guilty go free. This may or may not lead to more
crime, depending on whether the actor is likely to recidivate. On the other hand, with respect to
prevention, a false negative means that a harm will occur that otherwise would not. Therefore, getting
a false negative is worse for prevention.
In summary, the harms caused by false positives look less significant in the preventive context –
we are not missing the real wrongdoer and the harm we cause to the wrongfully detained is not as
significant (it is still significant, though). The harms caused by false negatives look more significant
because we fail to stop someone from completing his criminal plan. Thus, when weighing the error
distribution, it appears that there is more reason to adopt a clear and convincing standard than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
4. Adversarial Deficits
The question now is whether adversarial deficits tip the balance to a BRD standard. To this
point, I have argued that an erroneous act of preventive interference is not the same wrong as a
wrongful conviction; it is not as wrong as a wrongful conviction; and the tradeoffs between false
positives and false negatives militate for a lesser standard for preventive justice. Yet, there is one
concern that I have yet to address: the resource disparity between the state and the citizen. The state
differs from the typical defender, as it has resources and (perhaps) time on its side.100 (It is worth
noting, however, that if this regime is not criminal, then the state lacks some of its strongest
investigatory tools.)
Ultimately, I consider this to be a very close case. If I were advising the legislature, I would opt
for a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. We have every reason to fear that our current security
fetishism leads to overreaction and the improper sacrifice of individual liberties.101 Still, I wonder
whether BRD is truly normatively compelled. A preventive system, with release when one is no longer a
threat, is different in kind than the criminal law. And, the argument as to tradeoffs between false
positives and false negatives is quite compelling in pointing to a clear and convincing evidence standard.
My endorsement of BRD is thus quite tentative. I just think this case lies at the borderline.
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Conclusion
At the end of the day, what matters is not the label of a system as criminal nor the invocation of
the presumption of innocence. Rather, what matters is that the state accord its citizens with the proper
respect. It must protect them from outside threats but it must guard against the possibility that the
state itself will infringe citizens’ liberty out of fear. This holds true irrespective of what we may
ultimately decide the PoI means.
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